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The 1961 Rees-Levering Act: Caveat Venditor
The ancient Roman maxim caveat venditor may not be the exact semantic
equivalent of "seller beware,"' but it is not an inappropriate watchword for
dealers in the automobile sales industry. Since 1945 the California Conditional
Sales of Motor Vehicles Act 2 has regulated the formation, and to a large extent
the performance and discharge, of all motor vehicle conditional sale contracts.
This act was originally designed to stop various abuses and unfair practices
by automobile vendors and to protect the buyer where the transaction fell
just short of fraud or usury.8 In 1961, "as a part of a comprehensive reformu-
lation of the Automobile Finance Law,"4 the California legislature repealed the
existing act and enacted the Rees-Levering Motor Vehicle Sales Finance Act.,
Although it reenacted most of the major provisions of the 1945 law, the Rees-
Levering Act added many new significant provisions and revisions so that this
detailed and comprehensive legislation now regulates all phases of installment
purchases of motor vehicles. A technical and complicated statute, the 1961 act
well deserves the careful attention of both buyers and sellers lest it become
the proverbial "trap for the unwary."
PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS
Preliminary to the discussion, it should be noted that the Rees-Levering Act
is a separate piece of legislation and exclusively applies in certain cases. It is
not, for example, a part of the Uniform Sales Act 6 and will not be superceded
by the Uniform Commercial Code if adopted in this state.7 The original
statute, moreover, antedated the Unruh Act, and although the 1961 revision
'BLACK, LAW DICTIONARY 281 (4th ed. 1951).
Stats. 1945, c. 1030. References hereinafter made to the Conditional Sales of Motor Vehicles
Act (i.e., CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 2981-82 prior to January 1, 1962) are to Stats. 1959, c. 1466, unless
the text or footnote indicates otherwise. Prior to the Rees-Levering Act, the Conditional Sales of
Motor Vehicles Act was the subject of numerous amendments: Stats. 1949, c. 1594; Stats. 1951,
c. 342; Stats, 1957, c. 613; Stats. 1959, c. 1466; Stats. 1961, c. 243. As it appears in Stats. 1959,
c. 1466, however, the act is set out in its most representative form prior to repeal. (Stats. 1961,
c. 243 did not amend CAL. CIv. CODE § 2981.)
8 Stasher v. Harger-Haldeman, 58 A.C. 23, 372 P.2d 649, 22 Cal.Rptr. 657 (1962); General
Motors Accept. Corp. v. Kyle, 54 Cal.2d 101, 351 P.2d 768, 4 Cal.Rptr. 496 (1960); Carter v.
Seaboard Finance Co., 33 Cal.2d 564, 203 P.2d 758 (1949); People v. One 1955 Buick 2-Door
Coupe, 187 Cal.App. 684, 10 Cal.Rptr. 79 (1960).
'Stasher v. Harger-Haldeman, supra note 3, at 25 n. 1, 372 P.2d at 650 n. 1, 22 Cal.Rptr.
at 658 n. 1.
'Stats. 1961, c. 1626, p. 2647, §§ 1-4, 6, 7. Stats. 1961, c. 1626, p. 2652, § 5, which
amended CAL. VErH. CODE § 11713, is not discussed in this comment. Unless text or footnote
indicates otherwise, citations to CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 2981-2984.3 refer to Stats. 1961, c. 1626.
For the sake of brevity, the numbered "items" of CAL. CIV. CODE § 2 9 82 (a) under both acts are
cited by enclosing the item number in parentheses, although they are not so identified in the
statute.
6 CAL. CIv. CODE § 1721-99.
7Special Report by the California State Bar Committee on the Commercial Code, 37 CAL.
S.B.J. 117, 120 (1962). See also Cooper, New Wines and New Bottles: The Uniform Commercial
Code and the California Law of Chattel Security, 27 So. CALIF. L. REV. 265 (1954).
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adopted many "Unruh" provisions, the act is not a part of that legislation. 8 The
California statute, furthermore, while it has numerous counterparts in other
states, is sufficiently unique so that the courts have not had occasion to refer
to foreign law as an aid to the interpretation of the local provisions. 9
For internal purposes the act also has a limited application. Thus, an instru-
ment may be construed as a conditional sale contract to determine liability
under the provisions of the statute, but, at the same time, it may not be so
interpreted when other code sections are called into play. As an illustration, in
Gentry v. Kelley Kar Co.10 and in People v. One 1955 Buick 2-Door Coupe" an
"Automobile Leasing Agreement" was inconsistently construed by the same
district court of appeal. The same defendant (dealer) was involved in each
case, and in both cases the instruments before the court were essentially identi-
cal. The circumstances of the sale, furtherrmore, were also substantially similar.
Nevertheless, in the Gentry case the court held that the transaction was a condi-
tional sale within the meaning of the statute, but in the earlier case it had held
it was not. This apparent inconsistency, however, is resolved by the fact that
People v. One 1955 Buick 2-Door Coupe was an action by the state for forfeiture
of a vehicle for violation of the narcotics provisions of the Health and Safety
Code.' 2 If construed as a conditional sale contract, the agreement would be a
defense to the state's action. The court held that the definition of a conditional
sale contract as set out in the pertinent code section of the statute was limited
to actions arising under the act and therefore it was free to interpret the trans-
action differently for purposes of the Health and Safety Code.
While both the Gentry and Buick cases were decided under the 1945 statute,
they involved provisions which have been transferred virtually intact into the
1961 law. 13 They serve, therefore, to illustrate the further proposition that the
Rees-Levering Act is in many respects a codification and clarification of much of
the case law which interpreted and applied the original statute; and that cases
decided under the repealed code sections will continue to be important as
precedential and illustrative authority for problems growing out of the Rees-
Levering Act.14 Moreover, because of their nonretroactive effect, 15 the new
code sections will not be before the appellate courts for some time, and, for
8CA. CIv. CODE § 1801-1812.9. See also Note, 12 HASTINGS L.J. 312 (1961). Compare
Comment, 12 HASTiNcS L.J. 302 (1961). Examples of such legislative borrowings will be noted
in the text.
See generally Note, 58 COLUM. L. REv. 854 (1958). See also authorities listed in General
Motors Accept. Corp. v. Kyle, 54 Cal.2d 101 n. 2, 351 P.2d 768 n. 2, 4 Cal.Rptr. 496 n. 2 (1960);
and Annot., 73 A.L.R.2d 1432 (1960).
10 193 Cal.App.2d 324, 14 Cal.Rptr. 121 (1961).
"1 187 Cal.App.2d 684, 10 Cal.Rptr. 79 (1960).
"CAL. HEALTH & SAF. CODE §§ 11610-29.
"CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 2981(a)(1)-(3). See also Stasher v. Harger-Haldeman, 58 A.C. 23, 25
n. 1, 372 P.2d 649, 650 n. 1, 22 Cal.Rptr. 657, 658 n. 1 (1962).
11 Katsaros v. 0. E. Saugstad Co., 197 Cal.App.2d 745, 750, 17 Cal. Rptr. 453. 456 (1961).
1r Stats. 1961, c. 1626, p. 2652, § 6.
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awhile at least, litigation will primarily concern violations of the earlier provi-
sions. 16
DEFINITIONS
The Rees-Levering Act is set forth in the California Civil Code, sections
2981 to 2984.3 and, like its predecessor, lends itself to a two-fold classification:
definitions and regulations. Section 2981 sets out the definitions which are to
be followed by the courts in applying the regulatory provisions of sections 2982
to 2984.3. "Conditional sale contract" is defined by this section to include the
three traditional situations whereby property is transferred from a seller to a
buyer under an installment purchase arrangement. It thus covers the conditional
sale agreement where the seller retains title to the property pending perform-
ance of the contract by the buyer,17 or where he retains a lien as security for
such performance;' 8 and the bailment-lease transaction where the lessee pays
as "rental" the substantial equivalent of the value of the property and is bound
or has the option to become the owner of the property upon compliance with
the terms of the contract. 19
Carter v. Seaboard Finance Co., 20 the earliest case before the supreme court
under the original act, held that the above definitions also include the case
where the transfer is accomplished and secured by a chattel mortgage on the
motor vehicle rather than under a conditional sale contract as such. Although
originally section 2981 defined "seller" as a person who sells or leases property
under a conditional sale contract, the court also held that a finance company
selling a repossessed truck and trailer after default by the original buyer and
crediting the proceeds to his account was a "seller" within the meaning of the
statute.
As part of its overall revision of the act, the 1961 legislature redefined "seller"
to mean a "person engaged in the business of selling or leasing motor vehicles
under conditional sale contracts." 2' The apparent purpose behind this change
is to limit the operation of the statute to retail transactions and exclude the
casual private seller from its requirements. 22 If so, however, the rewording is
not entirely satisfactory, and counsel for finance companies and acceptance
corporations may have a new foundation upon which to base an argument that
the act does not apply to their clients in a Carter-type situation.
Both the 1945 and 1961 acts define the "cash price" of the motor vehicle as
10 See Stasher v. Harger-Haldeman, 58 A.C. 23, 372 P.2d 649, 22 Cal.Rptr. 657 (1962); Bank
of America v. Nielsen, 198 Cal.App.2d 131, 17 Cal.Rptr. 805 (1961); Katsaros v. 0. E. Saugstad
Co., 197 Cal.App.2d 745, 17 Cal.Rptr. 453 (1961).
17 CAL. CIv. CODE § 2 981(a)(1).
'a CAL. CIV. CODE § 2 981(a)(3).
19 CAL. CiV. CODE § 2981(a)(2).
'0 33 Cal.2d 564, 203 P.2d 758 (1949).
21 CAL. CIv. CODE § 2981(b).
21 Selected 1960-1961 California Legislation, 36 CAL. S.B.J. 643, 688-90 (1961).
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the amount in cash for which the seller would transfer unqualified title to the
vehicle to the buyer at the seller's place of business on the date the conditional
sale contract is executed, including applicable sale taxes.23 The 1961 definition
also includes the amount to be paid to any public officer in connection with the
transaction. 24 While this definition is not unduly difficult of application, it
should be noted that any adjustment or change in the down payment, finance
charge or contract balance may automatically distort the cash price figure, caus-
ing a violation of the statute. Thus where the seller credited a dealer's discount
to the down payment, the buyer later asserted that the figure representing the
cash price was thereby false and fictitious and violated the provisions of the
act. 25 While, in the particular case, the attempt ultimately proved unsuccessful,
its possibilities will not be overlooked by a subsequent generation of car buyers
seeking to avoid the effects of a bad bargain.
DOWN PAYMENT AND FINANCE CHARGE
The definition of the "down payment," as will be seen later, has caused
much litigation under the 1945 law, and the 1961 act has done little to clarify
the problem. The present definition, almost identical with the older one, defines
"down payment" as the amount in "cash or property value or money's worth"
which the buyer pays or agrees to pay at or prior to delivery of the motor
vehicle.26 By express provision of the 1961 .version of section 2981, the definition
also includes any "cash, property, or thing of value" deposited with the seller
pending the execution of the conditional sale contract, which must be refunded
if the contract is not completed. 27 Neither act defines "property value or money's
worth," and the cases, with one exception,28 have not been helpful in clarifying
the issue. However, it is clear that the dealer who accepts anything in addition
to or in lieu of cash as a down payment should separately itemize and describe
such payment or run the risk of having the contract avoided.
Any premium or interest collectible by the seller or finance agency for arrang-
ing installment payments of the purchase price must be stated on the face of
the contract 29 and the amount so collectible is definitely limited.
30 The 1945
act refers to this as the "time price differential."3 ' The Rees-Levering Act, how-
ever, discards this poetic phraseology for the more descriptive "finance charge."3
2
Regardless of its nomenclature, it means "any amount which the buyer agrees
23 CAL. CiV. CODE § 2981(e).
24 Ibid.
"5 Stasher v. Harger-Haldeman, 58 A.C. 23, 372 P.2d 649, 22 Cal.Rptr. 657 (1962).
" CAL. CrV. CODE § 2981(f).
'7 Ibid.
'8 Bratta v. Caruso Car Co., 166 Cal.App.2d 661, 333 P.2d 807 (1958). See text accompany-
ing note 71 infra.
" CAL. CIv. CODE § 2982(a) (6).
10 CAL. Civ. CODE § 2982(c).
8 Stats. 1959, c. 1466, p. 3762, § 1.
"2 CAL. Civ. CODE §§ 2981(h), 2982(a)(6), 2982(c).
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to pay to the seller in excess of the unpaid balance."3 3 The unpaid balance is
simply the cash price less the down payment, plus any insurance premiums called
for by the contract.3 4 Because of the narrow definitions given the latter terms,
any other charges than those expressly provided for should be considered as
part of the finance charge and treated as interest. For the dealer who has
already charged the maximum, this would make the contract usurious. Further-
more, the definition of the "contract balance" (the amount which the buyer
agrees to pay in installments) expressly prohibits the inclusion of any sums for
which the buyer may later become obligated under the terms of the contract in
connection with insurance, repair and maintenance, preservation of the security
interest "or otherwise."3 5
Great caution should be used in drafting a contract so that the cost itemiza-
tions will correspond accurately to the above definitions, for each definition, to
a greater or lesser degree, contains within itself one or more elements of the
others. As pointed out above, and to be further discussed, the misapplication of
one of these definitions leads inexorably to a violation of others, and although
the guilty seller might conceivably justify the original, he is soon involved in a
complicated scheme of noncompliance with the statutory terms.
SUBSTANCE, FORM AND THE "MOTOR VEHIL"
The Rees-Levering Act makes two further significant changes in the definitions
contained in the original legislation. For one thing, the act codifies, in a sense,
the implied holding of several cases that substance rather than (or, "as well
as") form governs the contract, and any attempt to make a conditional sale by
means of a "sale order" or "purchase order" will not relieve the seller from
complying with the disclosure aspects of the statute.36 Thus the 1961 act
requires any sales or purchase order, car reservation or "other instrument" to
contain the same recitals as the formal agreement, and this is so even if it is
only used pending the execution of the conditional sale contact.3 7 This new
regulation in a very real sense extends the scope of the act into the preliminary
negotiation stages as well as the formation of the contract.
The second significant definitional change made by the Rees-Levering Act
appears in the definition of a "motor vehicle." The 1945 act, as well as the
present statute, defined a motor vehicle as "any vehicle required to be registered
8' CAL. CIv. CODE § 2981(h).
8, CAL. Cxv. CODE § 2982(g).
,5 CAL. Cxv. CODE § 2981(i).
STri-City Credit Bureau v. Brimmer, 182 Cal.App.2d 321, 6 Cal.Rptr. 107 (1960); Foster v.Masters Pontiac Co., 158 Cal.App.2d 481, 322 P.2d 592 (1958). Cf. City Lincoln-Mercury Co. v.Lindsey, 52 Cal.2d 267, 339 P.2d 851 (1959); Carter v. Seaboard Finance Co., 33 Cal.2d 564, 203
P.2d 758 (1949); Gentry v. Kelley Kar Co., 193 Cal.App.2d 324, 14 Cal.Rptr. 121 (1961);
People v. One 1955 Buick 2-Door Coupe, 187 Cal.App.2d 684, 10 Cal.Rptr. 79 (1960); Dube v.Kelley Kar Co., 171 Cal.App.2d 862, 341 P.2d 774 (1959); United States Credit Bureau, Inc. v.
Sanders, 103 Cal.App.2d 806, 230 P.2d 849 (1951).
87 CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 2981(k), 2982(a). See also CAL. Cxv. CODE § 2984.3.
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under the Vehicle Code."38 The 1961 law, however, adds to this definition the
further qualification that the subject vehicle must be bought "primarily for
personal and family purposes."3 9 It expressly excludes motor vehicles "bought
primarily for business or commercial purposes."40
Taken in conjunction with the new definition of "seller," the Rees-Levering
Act effectively excludes both the casual private seller and the commercial buyer
of motor vehicles under conditional sale contracts. 41 Whether this was wise or
not remains to be seen, and much litigation involving these new definitions
can be anticipated.
While private sales of motor vehicles under conditional sale contracts are
probably best left unregulated, the changes in the definition of a motor vehicle
would seem to have the effect of excluding from the protection of the statute
a large class of buyers who have heretofore benefited by such protection. Quaere
whether this does not place many small businessmen in the same precarious
position they occupied prior to 1945.42 Consider, for example, the case of a
janitor who endeavors to better himself by establishing his own independent
maintenance business and, in so doing, purchases a new panel truck for five
thousand dollars under a conditional sale contract. It is doubtful that in such
a case he is any less in need of the protection of the statute than when, for the
same amount, he purchases a new car "primarily for personal and family pur-
poses." Numerous similar examples may be posed; e.g., an independent neigh-
borhood ice cream vendor. The operator of a large business or enterprise who
regularly buys or leases motor vehicles in the operation of his business is, no
doubt, better able to strike a fair bargain and to protect himself from unfair
practices. The act apparently makes no distinction between the two classes,
however, and courts are going to be hard pressed to justify such a distinction
by implication from the wording of the definition.
REGULATORY FEATURES OF TnE Acr
Section 2982, as originally enacted, and section 2982.5' added in 1959, 43
contained all the regulatory provisions of the Conditional Sale of Motor Vehicles
Act. This section with various subdivisions governed the formalities, execution
and contents of each contract, and it also regulated certain other matters
pertaining to performance and discharge. The Rees-Levering Act replaces old
section 2982 with a new section 2982 and adds other code sections to the act.
88 Stats. 1959, c. 1466, p. 3763, § 1.
So CAL. CIv. CODE § 2981(j).
,0 Ibid.
" See authority cited note 22 supra.
4" For example, the relief afforded the buyers in the two leading cases under the original 1945
act, Carter v. Seaboard Finance Co., 33 Cal.2d 564, 203 P.2d 748 (1949) and Estrada v. Alvarez,
38 Cal.2d 386, 240 P.2d 278 (1952), may not be available to similar buyers under present CAL.
CIv. CODE §§ 2981-82. See generally Selected 1960-1961 California Legislation, supra note 22 at
689-90.
"I Stats. 1959, c. 1874.
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Many of these new sections, however, are reenactments of subdivisions of the
original section 2982 as it was amended during the course of its comparatively
brief history. Essentially new sections 2982 to 2984.3 contain the same basic
legislation and do not indicate any major policy changes in the legislative pur-
poses behind the act, except in certain areas which will be noted later. New
section 2982 subdivisions (a) to (d) are virtually the same as their counterparts
in the older law. Subdivision (e), however, is now section 2983, and subdivisions
(f), (g) and (h) are now sections 2983.1 to 2983.3 respectively. Former section
2982.5, which permitted a contract clause requiring the buyer or registered owner
to give written notice of change of address to the 'legal owner," has not been
reenacted in the Rees-Levering Act.
The 1961 law, however, must not be taken as a mere recodification of the
original act in spite of what has been said above. This new act adds many
sophisticated qualifications and amendments to the older provisions and, aside
from requiring additional formalities and contents, the new law now regulates
far more fully redemption rights, remedies and actions arising under the statute,
correction of violations in certain cases without liability, and it adds many new
notice requirements.
FORMAL REQUIREMENTS
Subdivision (a) of new section 2982 of the Rees-Levering Act, like its
predecessor, prescribes the formalities and contents required for the proper
execution of each conditional sale contract of a motor vehicle within its cover-
age. While in a sense subdivision (a) is a Statute of Frauds, any analogy
between the two statutes would be hopelessly incomplete. For one thing,
subdivision (a) contains no exceptions: "Every conditional sale contract for
the sale of motor vehicle, with or without accessories, shall be in writing. ...
[and] shall be signed by the buyer .. .and by the seller" or their authorized
representatives. Note that both signatures are required for proper execution, not
merely that of the party to be charged. The Rees-Levering provisions, further-
more, go far beyond these simple requirements. The contract, if printed, shall
be set in no smaller than six-point type. It shall contain "in a single document"
all the agreements respecting total costs and terms of payment, "including any
promissory notes or any other evidences of indebtedness." When the buyer and
seller have signed the contract, "or purchase order," the latter must deliver a
fully executed copy of the contract to the buyer, containing no blanks to be
filled in later, and delivery of the motor vehicle is forbidden until he does so. 44
In addition to the above formalities, subdivision (a) requires each contract
to contain a separate statement of certain described items, which are then set
forth and numbered one to ten. The original act provided that the required
statements appear on the contract in the same order as they were set out in
44 CAL. Civ. CODE § 2982(a).
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subdivision (a) .45 One court, however, held that where the items did not appear
in the exact statutory order, the requirements of the subdivision were neverthe-
less substantially complied with.46 The decision on this point was of doubtful
authority until 1961 when the subdivision was amended to provide that the
items may appear in the contract "not necessarily in the sequence or order set
forth below."
The separate items called for by subdivision (a) include a statement of
the (1) cash price, (2) down payment, (3) unpaid cash price, (4) cost of any
insurance premiums included in the contract, (5) the unpaid balance, (6) amount
of the finance charge, (7) contract balance, and (8) the number, amount and
due dates of the installments required to pay the contract balance. Items (1) to
(8) of the Rees-Levering Act correspond with items (1) to (9) of the original
statute, with the exception of former item (5) which required a description of
fees paid to public officers on account of the sale and transfer.4 7 This provision
is now a part of the definition of the "cash price."48  The deletion of this
requirement from subdivision (a) thus caused a renumbering of items (6) to
(9) of the original.
Item (9) of the revised subdivision is the same as former item (10), and
requires the seller to list the names and addresses of all persons liable on the
contract or to whom certain notices are required or permitted to be sent.
Item (10) of the present subdivision, however, is an entirely new requirement,
being one of the borrowed "Unruh" provisions, and makes mandatory the
inclusion of a notice to the buyer appraising him of his essential rights and
obligations under the statute.
49
Later cases under the original act distinguished between the "formal" and
the "substantive" requirements of the statute,5 0 and the above provisions consti-
tute the former. This twofold characterization was appropriate and helped to
clarify some of the problems arising from a violation of the statute. In view
of the increased complexity of the law and the many new areas now regulated
by the 1961 act, the distinction may no longer be adequate to serve its purpose
and a more elaborate characterization and sub-classifications will probably be
called for.
,1 Stats. 1959, c. 1466, p. 3763, § 2.
,1 Millick v. Peer, 130 Cal.App.2d Supp. 894, 279 P.2d 212 (1955).
"1 Stats. 1959, c. 1466, p. 3764, § 2.
48CAL. CIV. CODE § 2981(e).
4" CAL. CIV. COnE § 2982(a)( 10). This provision reads: "A notice, in at least eight-point bold
type if the contract is printed, reading as follows: 'Notice to the buyer: (1) Do not sign this agree-
ment before you read it or if it contains any blank spaces to be filled in. (2) You are entitled to a
completely filled-in copy of this agreement. (3) Under the law, you have the right to pay off in
advance the full amount due and under certain conditions to obtain a partial refund of the finance
charge. (4) If you default in the performance of your obligations under this agreement, the vehicle
'may be repossessed and you may be subject to suit and liability for the unpaid indebtedness evi-
denced by this agreement.'" Compare CAL. CIv. CODE § 1803.2(c).
1 General Motors Accept. Corp. v. Kyle, 54 Cal.2d 101, 351 P.2d 768, 4 Cal.Rptr. 496 (1960);
Note, 39 CALIF. L. REv. 450 (1951).
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COMPLYING WITH Tm FORMAL REQUIHEMENTS
Under the original act, Carter v. Seaboard Finance Co., early decided that the
requirements of the statute were mandatory aprd not merely directory. The
decision on this point has been uniformly followed by subsequent cases, but
there soon developed some confusion as to what type of compliance was re-
quired by the law. Courts dealing with this problem generally agreed that
substantial compliance was required, but what acts did or did not amount to
substantial compliance in the individual case do not appear to have followed
a standardized pattern. While in Millick v. Peer' the court apparently used
"substantial" in a loose sense, other courts have applied a more stringent standard
and have used the term synonymously with "strict."5 2 Thus, where the buyer
could, by a simple mathematical computation of figures appearing on the
contract, easily ascertain the correct amount of the unpaid balance or time price
differential, there was, nevertheless, not sufficient compliance with the statute's
formal requirements. 53
Although the 1945 act did not contain the positive prohibition against
executing a blank contract or executing some preliminary agreement which
would be later transcribed into a conditional sale contract by the seller as is
expressed by subdivision (a) of the 1961 version, the courts early found a clear
implication of such meaning and did not hesitate to apply it. Until recently,
then, it was held that where the contract failed entirely to recite the required
statements, it was in violation of the statute.54 It was held that the buyer must
be able to tell at "first glance" the total extent of his obligations and indebted-
ness under the contract at the time he signs it, and, at such time, he is entitled
to receive an exact copy.5 5 If the buyer executed a blank contract which was
later filled in and executed by the seller, and a copy was thereafter mailed to
the buyer, even though it conformed in every respect to preliminary agreements
between the parties and no alterations were made in the agreed figures, the
agreement was not effectual and the statute was violated.56 Nor was a contract
which failed to recite the time price differential or contract balance cured by a
1 130 Cal.App.2d Supp. 894, 279 P.2d 212 (1955). See note 46 supra and accompanying
text Stasher v. Harger-Haldeman, 196 A.C.A. 605, 16 Cal.Rptr. 567, rev'd 58 A.C. 23, 372 P.2d
649, 22 Cal.Rptr. 657 (1962).
;'Adams v. Caruso Enterprises Inc., 134 Cal.App.2d 403, 285 P.2d 1022 (1955). Accord,
City Lincoln-Mercury Co. v. Lindsey, 52 Cal.2d 267, 339 P.2d 851 (1959); Bank of America v.
Nielsen, 198 Cal.App.2d 131, 18 Cal.Rptr. 205 (1961).
5 Ibid. See also cases cited note 36 supra. But see Desper v. J. T. Jenkins Co., 197 Cal.App.2d
277, 17 Cal.Rptr. 307 (1961).
5 City Lincoln-Mercury Co. v. Lindsey, 52 Cal.2d 267, 339 P.2d 851 (1959).
80 Tri-City Credit Bureau v. Brimmer, 182 Cal.App.2d 321, 6 Cal.Rptr. 107 (1960); Dube v.
Kelley Kar Co., 171 Cal.App.2d 862, 341 P.2d 774 (1959). See Foster v. Masters Pontiac Co.,
158 Cal.App.2d 481, 322 P.2d 592 (1958). Compare Zeff v. Harvey Smith Oldsmobile Co., 154
Cal.App.2d 1, 315 P.2d 371 (1957), indicating that the question of violation or nonviolation of the
statute may be immaterial where the issue is whether title passes to the buyer under the terms and
conditions of the automobile conditional sale contract.
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"Revision Agreement" executed between the buyer and a bank to which the
contract had been assigned by the seller, where the latter instrument also failed
to make the required recitals.
57
Desper v. J. T. Jenkins Co.,58 a late case under the 1945 act, made several
inroads into the established principles governing the interpretation of the statute.
In this case the seller had its head office in San Francisco, but negotiations were
conducted between the buyer and the seller's agent in Los Angeles, where the
purchaser ultimately executed the conditional sale contract. The contract was
then mailed to San Francisco where the president of the seller executed it and,
allegedly, had a copy mailed to the buyer. In an action by the buyer, he
charged that the execution of the contract was in violation of the statute and
that he had never received a copy of the contract. The judgment of the trial
court in favor of the seller was affirmed on appeal by division one of the second
district court of appeal. "The company," said the court, "should not be penalized
for accommodating plaintiff [the buyer] by permitting him to sign the contract
in Los Angeles instead of requiring him to come to San Francisco."5 9 The
court also rejected the buyer's contention that he had not received a copy of the
contract at all by relying on the presumption that the ordinary course of
business had been followed. 60
The result reached by the court in the Desper case is not entirely unjustified
by the particular facts and circumstances of that case. The spirit of the decision,
furthermore, has been impliedly affirmed by the supreme court in another and
more recent case."' However, it is submitted that the opinion is not completely
in accord with rulings of prior cases, and grounds for distinguishing them may
be somewhat questionable.6 2 Clearly an estoppel would have been a more
preferable basis upon which to find for the defendant in this action. And cer-
tainly the concept of estoppel is implicit in the decision. But if an offending
contract is "illegal" as some cases maintain, then an estoppel could not be
invoked without violating elementary contract principles.65 In any event Desper
does not recommend itself to this writer as a satisfactory decision upon which
to argue a relaxation of the formal requirements of the statute by the courts.
Undoubtedly the authority of the case will be limited to situations closely
parallel on the facts, and the whole problem here will not be duplicated in cases
concerning contracts executed after the effective date of the Rees-Levering Act
due to the change in the definition of a motor vehicle.
64
57 City Lincoln-Mercury Co. v. Lindsey, 52 Cal.2d 267, 339 P.2d 851 (1959). Compare Bank
of America v. Neilsen, 198 Cal.App.2d 131, 18 Cal.Rptr. 205 (1961).
5' 197 Cal.App.2d 277, 17 Cal.Rptr. 307 (1961).
"Id. at 286, 17 Cal.Rptr. at 313.
sr.CAL. CODE CIv. PRoc. § 1963(20).
01 Stasher v. Harger-Haldeman, 58 A.C. 23, 372 P.2d 649, 22 Cal.Rptr. 657 (1962).
"Compare cases cited notes 53 and 36 supra.
"See cases cited note 57 supra. See also Strong, The Enforceability Of Illegal Contracts, 12
HASTINGS L.J. 347 (1961).
64 CAL. CIV. CODE: § 2981(j).
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THE DowN PAYMENT REQUIREMENTS
Satisfying the "down payment" requirement of item (2) of the original sub-
division (a) of section 2982 and the application of the definition of the term
has been the cause of much litigation, and, unfortunately, the result of the
cases still leaves the question considerably clouded. Nor does the 1961 legisla-
tion help to clarify the confusion which has existed in the cases.65 The uncer-
tainty with regard to the down payment requirement persists primarily because,
although the issue was raised in many of the cases, it was seldom separately
discussed and explained. Where a violation of the requirement was charged it
has been nearly always blended with allegations of other violations of the
formal requisites of the statute. Generally the courts have treated such allega-
tions as a group and held that there was or was not substantial compliance with
the statute, or disposed of the case on other grounds. In the Carter case, for
example, the instrument covered two motor vehicles and failed to recite the
amount of down payment credited to each. However, the buyer also asserted
that the agreement violated the statute for failure to list the full cash price,
cost of insurance, total time price differential, itemized fees, and the amount
of the final installment. Without discussion of the alleged violations point by
point, the Carter court held that the formal requirements of the act were not
substantially complied with. In Estrada v. Alverez66 the same court had before
it a contract which recited a "cash" down payment of $3500, when in fact a
Buick reasonably worth $3800 was traded in as, and for, a down payment. But
it was also asserted that the contract failed to recite the cash price, unpaid
0t CAL. CIv. CODE § 2982(a) requires the contract to contain "in a single document all of the
agreements . . . including any promissory notes or any other evidences of indebtedness." It alsoprovides, "Every conditional sale contract shall contain .... 2. The amount of the buyer's down
payment, and whether made in cash or represented by the net agreed value of described property
traded in, or both, together with a statement of the respective amounts credited for cash and for
such property." CAL. CIv. CODE § 2981(f) includes "money's worth" and "thing of value," as well
as "property" and "property value." Apparently a distinction is intended. Whether a promissory
note is "money's worth" or a "thing of value" is fairly conjectural at this point, although the problem
is touched on in Bratta v. Caruso Car Co., 166 Cal.App.2d 661, 333 P.2d 807 (1958). In light of
the definition of "down payment," any promissory note or other evidence of indebtedness given by
the buyer to the seller prior to or at delivery of the motor vehicle would, theoretically, have to be apart of the down payment. Although item (2) does not expressly require a separate statement of
any indebtedness evidenced by a promissory note or similar instrument, the implication is clear from
the wording of subdivision (a), supra, and the holding in Bratta. Or, quaere, does subdivision (a)
require the note or otherwise to be embodied in the conditional sale contract, regardless of how the
payment represented by it is to be allocated. An infinite variety of possibilities may be imagined. It is
submitted that the provisions should be clarified in the statute. Reference to the legislative history
may not be entirely reliable in this and other areas. For example, the court in Katsaros v. 0. E.
Saugstad Co., 197 Cal.App.2d 745, 749, 17 Cal.Rptr. 453, 456 (1961) quotes the following state-
ment from the final report of the Assembly Interim Committee on Finance and Insurance, dated
December 1960: "He [the buyer] knows also that the law as it now stands is so vague and uncertain
that the results of a successful suit cannot be known, or even reasonably appraised in advance of thejudgment itself, and the dealer has everything to gain and nothing to lose in fighting the case as long
as he possibly can." Since both the Kyle and Lindsey cases were or should have been before the
committee at the time, this broad generalization has doubtful validity. See note 149 intra.
00 38 Cal.2d 386, 240 P.2d 278 (1952).
cash price and the time price differential. In Baum v. Aleman,
6 7 the subject
contract recited a total down payment of $788.80, including a cash payment of
$388.80 and a trade-in worth $400. The evidence, however, showed that the
buyer had delivered only $120 in cash and gave his promissory note for $268.80
as the balance of the cash down payment. The buyer here also charged viola-
tions of other formal requirements, such as the contract balance and time price
differential. In both Estrada and Baum the contract was held to violate the
provisions of the act without a separate discussion of the down payment issue.
On the other side of the coin, however, some courts have held a contract
good where similar violations were urged. In General Motors Accept. Corp. v.
Gilbert6 s the agreement recited a cash down payment of $700, of which only
$400 had been paid. "The contention that the contract was void for failure to
comply with Civil Code, section 2982," the court said, "cannot be sustained."
69
The conditional sale contract in Murray v. Lure
7
" listed a down payment of
$890.85. This sum represented the agreed value of a lot which the buyer
promised to convey to the seller as a down payment on a house trailer. It is not
clear from the opinion just how this figure was listed on the contract, and the
buyer's contention that the figure was a "fabrication" was apparently based on
the valuation of the land in question. Assuming that the agreement merely
recited a "down payment of $890.85," or listed the figure under the heading of
"cash," clearly an issue, other than the value of the lot, should have been raised.
In any event, the court held that "the statements set forth in the conditional
sales contract complied with the requirements of section 2982 of the Civil
Code."7' In both cases the facts indicated, and the buyer charged, other viola-
tions of the formal requirements.
One case to meet the question head on was Bratta v. Caruso Car Co.
72 The
contract here stated a "cash" down payment of $300. The fact of the matter
was that the buyer had executed a promissory note for that amount and
delivered it to the seller in lieu of actual cash. The district court of appeal held
that such facts constituted a violation of the statute. "There is nothing," stated
the court, "to suggest that the word 'cash' in the statute is used in any other than
its usually understood meaning of money."78 Nor was a promissory note
"money's worth" within the meaning of the definition of "down payment" so as
to allow it to stand under a recital of "cash." The court, furthermore, refused
to construe the conditional sale contract and the promissory note as a single
instrument, holding that all the agreements between the parties are to be set
out in the former and not otherwise. The court was also quick to point out that
07 139 Cal.App.2d Supp. 929, 293 P.2d 162 (1956).
18 196 Cal.App.2d 732, 17 Cal.Rptr. 35 (1961).
0I Id. at 739, 17 Cal.Rptr. at 40.
70 147 Cal.App.2d 176, 305 P.2d 75 (1956).
71 Id. at 179, 305 P.2d at 77.
71 166 Cal.App.2d 661, 333 P.2d 807 (1958).
11 Id. at 664, 333 P.2d at 810.
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even if a contrary conclusion was warranted, the unpaid cash price was in
reality $300 more than the figure stated on the contract because of the note,
and this was in and of itself a violation of the provisions of the act.
Counsel for the seller in the Bratta case had argued, not without foundation,
that the buyer was fully informed of his obligations, understood the full signifi-
cance of the contract, and with respect thereto he was never misled or deceived.
It might also be pointed out that the seller's acceptance of the promissory note
was an "accommodation" extended by him to enable the buyer to secure inde-
pendent financing. The court conceded that the statute was a shield and not a
sword, that it was not intended to provide car buyers with a "windfall," and it
did not dispute the argument of counsel on the points mentioned. Nevertheless,
it pointed out, "the prescribed form and requisites of section 2982 are mandatory
and a failure of a seller to comply thereto renders the contract unenforceable." 74
ENTER DIVISION Two
An interesting sidelight on the problem of the down payment issue, is the
fact that the Gilbert and Bratta cases and Stasher v. Harger-Haldeman,75 before
it was reviewed by the supreme court, were decided by different divisions of
the same district court of appeal.76 In the Stasher case the buyer was credited
with $1600 toward the total down payment as the value of a trade-in, which,
however, took a $1648.10 pay-off, leaving a net deficiency of $48.10. His down
payment, on the other hand, was also credited with a dealer's discount of
$632.62, giving him a "total down" of $584.53. This figure, asserted the plaintiff
in her action to rescind the contract, was false and fictitious because it was not
an amount paid or agreed to be paid by the buyer. Furthermore, the cash price
was also claimed to be illusory since it did not reflect the dealer's discount and
was thus not the amount for which the seller would transfer unqualified title
to the car at the time and place of the contract's execution. The plaintiff also
objected to the manner of listing the fees to be paid on account of the transfer
and the fact that the agreement recited "36" in one place and "39" in another
as the number of installments. The appellate court agreed with the plaintiff
and reversed the trial court's judgment for the seller, holding that the require-
ments of the statute had not been complied with by him.
While hard law perhaps in the individual case, both the Bratta and Stasher
decisions are based on substantial authority and are logical extensions of previ-
ously established constructions and principles. Citing three supreme court
decisions and Bratta v. Caruso Car Co., the district court of appeal in the Stasher
case made the following observations.
It is well settled that the use of an inaccurate or a fictitious figure in the
14 Id. at 667, 333 P.2d at 811.
' 196 A.C.A. 605, 16 Cal.Rptr. 557, rev'd, 58 A.C. 23, 372 P.2d 649, 22 Cal.Rptr. 657 (1962).
" Second District. Gilbert, Division One; Bratta, Division Three; Stasher, Division Two.
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statement of the cash price or the down payment constitutes a substantial
violation of the statue ...
It seems clear that the inclusion of a discount in the stated down payment
would not serve to make the buyer aware of the true substance of the trans-
action. . . . [T]he false inclusion of an unrealistic down payment tends to
frustrate the purpose of the statute requiring clear, full and accurate dis-
closure. 77
LICENSE AND REGISTRATION FEES
Before reviewing the supreme court decision in Stasher v. Harger-Haldeman,7s
which is probably the most important pronouncement of that court since the
Carter case, one other problem regarding the formal requirements must be
examined. The issue here concerns the seller's compliance with the provisions
of item (5) of subdivision (a) of the original section 2982. Item (5) required
a description and itemization of any sums to be actually paid to any public
officer as fees in connection with the transaction and which are included in the
contract balance. In the Stasher case the instrument contained the following
recital: "(5) Fees (License and Vehicle tax) ........ 57.00." After setting out
the above statement, the district court of appeal made the following holding.
Similarly, the contract involved in General Motors Accept. Corp. v. Kyle,
upra, 54 Cal. 2d 101, 106, recited only "FEES PAID: Registration and
Transfer $ ....... Other $ ...... $54.00." In the last cited decision, this
was held to constitute a material violation of subdivision (a) of section 2982.
A similar holding is required here since the facts are essentially the same.
79
In addition to the Kyle case cited by the district court of appeal above,
Bank of America v. Nielsens ° also held that the requirements of item (5) were
not complied with where the contract recited, "5. Fees paid: Notary Public
$ ........ , Registration and Transfer $2.00, other $29.86, (total) $31.86." Carter
v. Seaboard Finance Co.,"' moreover, had held the subject agreement invalid
where, among other violations, it failed to make any recital at all regarding
such fees.
In the Millick and Murray cases, however, the contracts were upheld where
one recited "D.M.V. fees $24.00" and the other "TR. Lie. $24.00." In Desper v.
J. T. Jenkins Co. a district court of appeal reached a result apparently inconsistent
with the Carter case on this issue. The contract in Desper contained no recital
at all referring to any fees paid or to be paid to a public officer in connection
with the transaction. But the court also found that there was a collateral
agreement between the parties with respect to the payment of such fees, by
77 Stasher v. Harger-Haldeman, 196 A.C.A. 605, 610, 16 Cal.Rptr. 557, 560 (1961).
78 58 A.C. 23, 372 P.2d 649, 22 Cal.Rptr. 657, reversing 196 A.C.A. 605, 16 Cal.Rptr. 557
(1962).
71 Stasher v. Harger-Haldeman, 196 A.C.A. 605, 610, 16 Cal.Rptr. 557, 560 (1961).
:0 198 Cal.App.2d 131, 18 Cal.Rptr. 205 (1961).
s' 33 CaI.2d 564, 203 P.2d 758 (1949).
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which the seller would pay them and extend credit to the buyer on an open
book account for the amount of such payment. The reasoning of the court was
that item (5) required the inclusion of such fees only as are included in the
contract balance. This specific provision, it held, controlled the general provi-
sion that the contract must contain all the agreements between the parties, 82
and so the failure to make the recital in question was not a violation of the
statute.83
JUSTICE SciAR AND MRS. STASHEII
Just as Carter v. Seaboard Finance Co. was the first of many decisions to
litigate the question of compliance with the formal requisites of the original act,
the opinion of Mr. Justice Schauer in Stasher v. Harger-Haldeman may well be
the last. It may be presumptive to say that Stasher is the last word on the
subject, but the policy of the supreme court is expressed in such clear and
forceful terms that no subsequent litigation should be instituted, either on con-
tracts governed by the original act or the 1961 Rees-Levering Act, without
careful attention being given to this decision.
When the Stasher case was before the supreme court, that body was perhaps
troubled somewhat by certain facts of the case not discussed in the opinion of
the lower appellate court. There was, for example, the fact that this was an
action instituted by the buyer's wife after his demise and after the car had been
in their possession for two and one-half years without any objection being made
by either. During such time, furthermore, it had been driven 63,000 miles and
$4,634.31 had been paid on a contract balance of $4,636.84. Nothing in the
facts indicated any particular question of fraud, usury or overreaching.8 4 The
court was undoubtedly impressed by the obvious inequity of the situation, which,
in turn, only served to emphasize the real vacuity of the plaintiff's assertions.
The recital regarding fees to be paid to a public officer fully complied with
the terms of the statute. Item (5), it held, did not require that license fees and
vehicle registration fees be itemized independently of each other, and it noted
that both the license and registration fees are required by law to be paid to the
82 Stats. 1959, c. 1466, p. 3763, § 2: compare "Every conditional sale contract . . . shall con-
tain all of the agreements between the buyer and the seller relating to the personal property
described therein," with "It shall recite the following separate items. . . . 5. A description and
itemization of amounts, if any, which will actually be paid by a seller or his assignee to any public
officer as fees in connection with the transaction, which are included in the contract balance."
83 But cf. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 2981(e), 2982(a). The former section would seem to preclude
this sort of arrangement. Alsd, under the latter section, would extending credit on an open book
account be an "other" evidence of indebtedness within its meaning?
0' See Lewis v. Muntz Car Co., 50 Cal.2d 861, 328 P.2d 968 (1958); Gentry v. Kelley Kar
Co., 193 Cal.App.2d 324, 14 Cal.Rptr. 121 (1961); Dube v. Kelley Kar Co., 171 Cal.App.2d 863,
341 P.2d 774 (1959). Although not discussed in the opinion, and not material to the issues, the
possibility of fraud is noted in Bratta v. Caruso Car Co., 166 Cal.App.2d 661, 667 n. 1, 333 P.2d
807, 811 n. 1 (1958).
[Vol. 3
same department of the state government, the Department of Motor Vehicles."5
The discrepancy between the number of installments was a typographical error,
an accidental or bona fide error in computation. As to the effect of the dealer's
discount on the down payment and cash price figures, the plaintiff's argument
was purely speculative, and the inclusion of the discount as part of the down
payment could not reasonably mislead either the buyer or a third party subse-
quently financing the sale. "There is nothing unlawful," the court concluded,
"in the terms of the transaction which the parties negotiated . . . and all other
requirements of the statute having been met, we fail to find any basis for
rescission by plaintiff." 6 Justice Schauer further reasoned:
Substantial compliance, as the phrase is used in the decisions, means
actual compliance in respect to the substance essential to every reasonable
objective of the statute. But when there is such actual compliance as to all
matters of substance then mere technical imperfections of form or variations
in mode of expression by the seller, or such minima as obvious typographical
errors, should not be given the stature of noncompliance and thereby trans-
formed into a windfall for an unscrupulous and designing buyer ...
We do not suggest that imperfections in either the form or substance of
motor vehicle contracts are to be encouraged. Any error or omission in writing
the contract, even if apparently unimportant in itself, conceivably could
combine with some other circumstance to become important. The legislation
in question is intended to be rigid and exacting. It is so designed because
the State found that there were some automobile dealers (even as there are
some dishonest persons, at least from time to time, in every business or pro-
fession) who are seeking not to render an honest service but, rather, delib-
erately to overreach, oppress and mulct any trusting customer. Because a law
must be universal in its application to any class, and because it must be
drafted to govern the acts of the worst offender in the class, it follows that
all members of the class, the great majority of whom are honest and respected
automobile dealers, some of them probably serving the third or fourth gen-
eration of appreciative customers, must suffer the inconvenience of being
scrupulously careful in the preparation of contracts, in the performance of
all things required by the subject legislation, and in keeping a record of the
same.
We understand the burden imposed on these businessmen, as well as the
basis for the law, and we understand also that in some of their relationships
with customers-or pretending customers-it will be the dealer rather than
the customer who needs protection. The case at bench appears to be of the
latter type. When appropriate facts are shown courts should be equally as
alert to protect the one party to a contract as the other.8 7
The reasoning of the opinion in this case and the result reached here by
85 Stasher v. Harger-Haldenan, 58 A.C. 23, 32, 372 P.2d 649, 654, 22 Cal.Rptr. 657, 662
(1962) citing CAL. REV. & TAX CODE §§ 10751, 10851 and CAL. VEH. CODE § 9250. The trial
court took " 'judicial notice of the fact that the State of California annually assessed a [single]
charge for license and vehicle tax.'" Id. at 27 n. 2, 372 P.2d 651 n. 2, 22 Cal.Rptr. 659 n. 2.
88 Id. at 31, 372 P.2d at 653, 22 Cal.Rptr. at 661.
81 Id. at 29, 33, 372 P.2d 652, 655, 22 Cal.Rptr. at 660, 663.
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the supreme court cannot seriously be challenged. On each of the issues pre-
sented, however, the decision did not require extraordinary analytical powers
or the metaphysical dissection of legal principles, simply an awareness of the
facts of life and a refusal to be bound by a too rigid theory of construction or
an unquestioning adherence to precedent. The real power of the decision
actually lies in the above-quoted dictum by which the court apparently settles
with uncharacteristic finality questions of compliance with the statutory provi-
sions and the legislative purpose behind the statute. And to forestall any
argument that dicta is not authority, it should be noted that the Stasher opinion
is essentially founded on dicta set out in General Motors Accept. Corp. v. Kyle ss
which preceded Stasher in the supreme court.8 9
NEW FORMAL REQUIREMENTS
The 1961 Rees-Levering Act contains, in addition to the changes listed above,
several formal requirements which were not a part of the original legislation
nor embodied in the numerous amendments to the 1945 law.
Under the provisions of Vehicle Code section 5604, a dealer is required to
notify the buyer in writing if the insurance on the motor vehicle required by
him does not insure the buyer against damages for personal injury or property
damage. Civil Code section 2984.1 provides the manner by which a seller,
under the Rees-Levering Act, must comply with the mandate of the Vehicle
Code section. Thus every contract for the conditional sale of a motor vehicle
must contain a statement informing the buyer that he is not insured against
such liability unless a charge for such insurance is included in the agreement.
The statute again specifies the size and facing of type to be used if the contract
is printed and sets out the exact wording of the notice.
Several cases decided under the original act involved, as part of the trans-
action, chattel mortgages given by the buyer on property other than the subject
motor vehicle. 0 In one case a deed of trust on real property was given as
additional security."' The inherent danger of abuse in such cases is now obviated
by section 2984.2, which makes unenforceable any agreement in connection
with the conditional sale which confers a security interest-title or lien-on any
real or personal property other than the motor vehicle and which is given to
secure the payment of the contract balance.
New section 2984.3 is another of the adapted "Unruh" provisions and provides
8' 54 Cal.2d 101, 351 P.2d 768, 4 Cal.Rptr. 946 (1960).
89 After quoting Kyle to the effect that the statute constitutes a shield rather than a sword for
buyers in proper cases, and that it should not be applied in a manner which will give a windfall to
the conditional purchaser, the opinion remarks, "As will hereinafter be shown, that language is par-
ticularly applicable to the case at bench." Stasher v. Harger-Haldeman, 58 A.C. 23, 29, 372 P.2d
649, 652, 22 Cal.Rptr. 657, 660 (1962). (All emphasis supplied.)
:0 Gentry v. Kelley Kar Co., 193 Cal.App.2d 324, 14 Cal.Rptr. 121 (1961); Dube v. Kelley Kar
Co., 171 Cal.App.2d 862, 341 P.2d 774 (1959).
91 People v. One 1955 Buick 2-Door Coupe, 187 Cal.App.2d 684, 10 Cal.Rptr. 79 (1960).
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several presumptions relative to delivery of a copy of the contract to the buyer.92
The contract may contain, for example, an acknowledgment of such delivery by
the buyer. If so, however, it must be printed or written in the equivalent of
ten point bold face type and must appear directly over the buyer's signature.
Where these requirements are met, the buyer's execution creates a rebuttable
presumption of delivery of a completely filled-in copy of the contract "in any
action or proceeding by or against a third party without knowledge to the
contrary when he acquired his interest in the contract."93 If the buyer receives
a copy of the contract or a notice containing items (1) to (8) of subdivision (a)
of section 2982 and fails to give written notice within thirty days to the holder
that he did not receive a copy of the contract complying with the remaining
requirements of the act, there is a conclusive presumption of a valid delivery
in favor of such third person.
Under the provisions of the 1945 law, subdivision (b) of section 2982 pro-
vided that whenever any charge for insurance is included in the contract balance
the seller must, within thirty days, provide the buyer with the policy or an exact
copy of it. These provisions were considered as part of the formal requirements
of the act. They were discarded by the 1961 revision,9 4 however, and now sub-
division (b) provides that where any amount is charged to the buyer for
insurance and is included in the contract balance, but not to be disbursed until
one year after the date of the execution of the contract, the finance charge on
such amount can only be computed from the month of disbursement to the date
of the last payment. In light of this legislative change, therefore, it is clear that
the new subdivision (b) of section 2982 is another anti-usury provision and must
be classified with the substantive requirements of the statute to be discussed
next.
SUBSTANTIVE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ACT
The so-called "substantive" requirements of the 1945 act were incorporated
in subdivisions (c) to (g) of section 2982. Subdivision (h), added in 1959, 95
prohibited the inclusion of any contract provision which would allow the holder
to accelerate maturity and repossess the motor vehicle except upon the buyer's
default of any of his obligations under the contract. This provision, going as it
did to the contents of the contract, must be deemed another of the act's formal
requirements. Its counterpart in the 1961 law, however, which is new section
2983.3, also forbids acceleration and repossession in absence of default by the
buyer in the performance of any of his obligations under the contract. The
section does not refer to the contents of the contract and, presumably, covers
also contingencies not provided for by its terms and which the seller or holder
92 Compare CAL. CIV. CODE § 1803.7.
" CAL. CIV. CODE § 2984.3.
"But see CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 2981(g), 2981(i), 2982(a) (4), 2982(b), 2984.1.
9 Stats. 1959, c. 1466, p. 3765, § 2.
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might attempt to impose subsequent to its execution. Section 2983.3 then must
be considered part of the statute's new substantive requirements.
Subdivision (c) of the original statute set the maximum allowable amount
of time price differential at one percent of the unpaid balance multiplied by
the number of months between the date of the contract and the due date of the
last installment. This provision, therefore, provided an easy method of computing
the maximum allowable time price differential and has been retained by the
1961 reenactment.9 6 Most of the cases based upon a violation of subdivision
(c) involved a correlative problem in the area of remedies and sanctions rather
than issues concerning the computation of the time price differential figure it-
self. In any case, where the question of interest, finance charge or time price
differential arises it should be recalled that the requirements of subdivision (c)
are severable from the formal provisions requiring the contract to recite the
amount so charged by the seller. Thus the contract may recite a figure as the
finance charge or time price differential (thereby complying with the formal
requirement), which may, however, be in an amount in excess of that allowed
by subdivision (c), thus violating the substantive provision. Conversely, the
figure may well conform with the substantive limitation, yet its exclusion or
distortion on the contract will be in violation of subdivision (a). In either case,
the definitions provided by section 2981 should not be overlooked.97
Under the provisions of subdivision (d) of former section 2982, the buyer
was given the right, notwithstanding any of the terms of the contract, to pay off
his full indebtedness under the contract at any time prior to its maturity. By
satisfying such indebtedness, furthermore, he was entitled thereby to receive
refund credit on the amount of the unpaid time price differential; and the
subdivision set out the method for computing such refund credit. The 1961
version of this subdivision contains nearly identical provisions. 8 One significant
change, however, was made. Presumably, under the 1945 act, the buyer was
entitled to a credit refund only in the event of a voluntary prepayment by him
or by some other person for his account. If the buyer defaulted, or otherwise
rescinded or refinanced the contract and was not entitled to recover for a viola-
tion of the statute, the seller or holder no doubt could enforce payment of the
full time price differential as provided in the terms of the contract. On contracts
executed subsequent to the effective date of the Rees-Levering Act, the seller
or holder can no longer recover such amount, for the revised provisions of
subdivision (d) now provide that where the buyer's indebtedness is liquidated,
whether by prepayment "or refinancing, or upon surrender or repossession and
resale of the motor vehicle," he is entitled to the credit refund on the "un-
:0 CAL. CIv. CODE § 2982(c).
'7 CAL. Cxv. CODE §§ 2981(e)-(i), (k). See generally Carter v. Seaboard Finance Co., 33
Cal.2d 564, 578-82, 203 P.2d 758, 767-69 (1949), for discussion of the California usury law at the
time of the original enactment of the statute.
98 CAL. Cxv. CODE § 2982(d).
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earned portion of the finance charge" either in cash or as a credit against the
amount due by virtue of his obligations under the contract.9 9 Both versions of
subdivision (d) also save for the seller or holder any interest or charges due
from the buyer for delinquent installments or collection costs.
100
The above provisions of subdivisions (c) and (d) were, and still are, the
basic "substantive" provisions of the statute. In none of the cases where a
substantive violation was alleged, was the question of compliance with their
requirements seriously challenged. The terms of the provisions were sufficiently
clear and the methods of computing the finance charge or amount of credit
refund could be easily handled without an accountant's knowledge of business
mathematics or algebraic equations.
REMEDIES AND SANCTONS
In spite of their apparent clarity, subdivisions (c) and (d) were the subject
of a tremendous amount of litigation under the 1945 statute. The problems
which gave rise to the controversies, however, stemmed from interpretations of
subdivisions (e) and (f) of former section 2982. l 1 Subdivision (e) provided
that if the seller violated the requirements of subdivisions (c) or (d), the con-
tract was unenforceable, except by a bona fide purchaser for value, and the
buyer could, in a civil action, recover the "total amount paid on the contract
balance" from the seller or his assignee. In similar terms subdivision (f) provided
that if the "holder" violated the terms of subdivision (d), the buyer could recover
"the total amount paid . . . to such holder pursuant to the terms of such con-
tract." 0 2 In both situations, however, a violation was not actionable if it resulted
from an accidental or bona fide error in computation. Nothing further was
expressed by the statute regarding the buyer's recovery for a violation of the
subdivisions, and no sanctions were provided for a violation of the formal require-
ments, that is, subdivisions (a) or (b). Herein lay the crux of the problem
which, before it was finally resolved by the courts prior to 1961, caused con-
siderable confusion in the cases.'
0l
Carter v. Seaboard Finance Co., again, settled the question of the effect of
a violation of the formal requirements of the original act.
The obvious purpose of the statute is to protect purchasers of motor vehicles
against excessive charges by requiring full disclosure of all items of cost. If
the statute be construed as mandatory the contract was unenforceable . . .
g9 Ibid.
loo Compare CAL. CIV. CODE § 2982(d) with § 2983.4.
101 Stats. 1959, c. 1466, p. 3765, § 2.
log Ibid.
10 See Williams v. Caruso Enterprises, 140 Cal.App.2d Supp. 793, 977, 295 P.2d 592, 595
(1956).
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for the reason that it was in violation of the statute. This is so notwith-
standing the fact that the statute does not expressly pronounce it So.104
Estrada v. Alverez,105 following and citing Carter, set out the rule in more
positive language: "[T]he form and requisites of the statute are mandatory; a
contract which does not substantially conform thereto is unenforceable; and a
buyer who has made payments to the seller under such a contract may recover
them."06
Oddly enough, however, despite these supreme court pronouncements one
lower appellate court, in 1955, held that the penalty of unenforceability under
subsection (e) did not apply to a violation of subsection (a) or (b).10 7 It im-
pliedly reversed itself in a later decision.' 0 8
The Carter and Estrada cases, moreover, pointed out that there were no
equitable objections to prevent the buyer's recovery for a formal violation,
inasmuch as he is not considered in pari delicto and is a member of the class
intended to be protected by the legislation.
Having apparently settled the rule that a buyer may recover for a formal
as well as substantive violation, the courts were then faced with questions far
more difficult to answer. Conceding that the buyer's action was maintainable
in either instance, what, for example, was the measure of damages or recovery?
He could, of course, recover the "total amount paid on the contract balance,"' 00
but could he also recover his down payment? If so, what was the value of his
trade-in if it was no longer in possession of the dealer? Could the buyer keep
the car? The code provided that he could recover in a "civil action," but was
the remedy common law or statutory? Was the seller, on the other hand, entitled
to an offset in the buyer's action? If so, how was it valued? Could the seller
obtain affirmative relief if the offset exceeded the demand of the buyer. What
was the applicable statute of limitations? Was prompt notice of rescission and
an offer of restitution a necessary condition of the buyer's action? And what
pleadings were appropriate to raise an issue of violation of the statute or a
seller's right to an offset, if any existed?
The answer to these questions and others would seem to lie in the resolution
of a more fundamental consideration, namely, what was the legal status of a
contract which violated the formal or substantive provisions of the statute. Thus
a preliminary determination of whether the contract was void or only voidable,
and whether it was illegal or merely unenforceable, would clarify and resolve
many of the problems listed above. Unfortunately, however, no definitive or
104 Carter v. Seaboard Finance Co., 33 Cal.2d 564, 573, 203 P.2d 758, 764 (1949). Note that
the court reached this result even though subdivisions (d), (e) and (f) were not added until Stats.
1949, c. 1594 and thus not before the court in this case.
105 38 Cal.2d 386, 240 P.2d 278 (1952).
100 Id. at 389, 240 P.2d at 280.
107 Millick v. Peer, 130 Cal.App.2d Supp. 894, 279 P.2d 212 (1955).
108 Baum v. Aleman, 139 Cal.App.2d Supp. 929, 293 P.2d 162 (1956).
109 Stats. 1959, c. 1466, p. 3765, § 2.
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satisfactory answer has been presented by the cases and only a partial solution
has been effected by the 1961 revision of the statute. In practically all of the
cases, the reader will find that the terms "void," "voidable," "illegal," and "unen-
forceable" have been used interchangeably and synonymously without any
specific attention being directed to their more restricted meanings. Two courts
have given some consideration to the problem, but the results reached by them
have been far from conclusive. 110 In Williams v. Caruso Enterprises"' the court
held that the contract is "voidable at the behest of the innocent party," whom it
likened to "one who is the victim of fraud."" 2 The supreme court used similar
language later in the Kyle case when it referred to the contract as "voidable at
the instance of the buyer," going on to say that the seller does not completely
forfeit his security interest in the vehicle by virtue of his violation of the
statute. 13
From the discussion of the issue in the Kyle case, the only opinion to give the
problem any real consideration, it is manifest that a contract which violates the
provisions of the act exists in some sort of twilight zone and must be specially
characterized. In spite of its attempt to clarify the question, the Kyle court
continues to refer to the seller's "illegality," and to the "illegal" contract. In
City Lincoln-Mercury Co. v. Lindsey, 1 4 decided in the year prior to Kyle, the
supreme court was presented with a contract which violated the formal require-
ments of the statute and the seller asserted that because of certain facts in the
case the buyer was estopped to rely on the violations. In answer to this con-
tention the court said "A party to an illegal contract cannot ratify it, cannot be
estopped from relying on the illegality, and cannot waive his right to urge that
defense."" 5 Subsequent cases continue to refer to the contract as void and
illegal as well as voidable and unenforceable." 6
Placing the cart before the horse, however, the courts have evolved some
fairly well settled rules relating to recovery under the act."17 Thus, it has been
generally agreed that a seller whose violation of the statute is substantive may
not claim a setoff against the buyer's recovery.1 8 The most he is entitled to is
the return of the car." 9 If the seller's violation is formal only, he may set off
against the amount recoverable by the buyer a sum equal to the loss sustained
by him as a result of the depreciation in the value of the car caused by the use
"' See Baum v. Aleman, 139 Cal.App.2d Supp. 929, 932, 293 P.2d 162, 164 (1958).
111 140 Cal.App.2d Supp. 973, 295 P.2d 592 (1956).
112 Id. at 978, 295 P.2d at 596.
1"8 General Motors Accept. Corp. v. Kyle, 54 Cal.2d 101, 109 n. 5, 351 P.2d 768, 773 n. 5,
4 Cal.Rptr. 496, 501 n. 5 (1960).
"4 52 Cal.2d 267, 339 P.2d 851 (1959).
"' Id. at 274, 339 P.2d at 856.
"' See, e.g., General Motors Accept. Corp. v. Gilbert, 196 Cal.App.2d 732, 17 Cal.Rptr. 35
(1961); cases cited note 16 supra.
"I See generally General Motors Accept. Corp. v. Kyle, 54 Cal.2d 101, 351 P.2d 768, 4 Cal.
Rptr. 496 (1960); City Lincoln-Mercury v. Lindsey, 52 Cal.2d 267, 339 P.2d 851 (1959).
I' Lewis v. Muntz Car Co., 50 Cal.2d 681, 328 P.2d 968 (1958).
119 Katsaros v. 0. E. Saugstad Co., 197 Cal.App.2d 745, 17 Cal.Rptr. 453 (1961).
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of it while in the buyer's possession.12 0 In no event may the seller offset an
amount exceeding that to which the buyer is entitled to recover;1 2 1 and no
consideration will be given to depreciation in market value or the rental value
of the vehicle to the buyer.122 The reasoning behind the sanctions for a substan-
tive violation is based on the language of the statute and the legislative policy
behind the act. The rationale of the formal sanctions is predicated on the rule
that "courts will not impose penalties for non-compliance with statutory provi-
sions in addition to those that are provided expressly or by necessary implica-
tion." 2 3
Although subdivision (e) stated that the buyer may recover the total amount
paid by him on the "contract balance," it has been held that such sanctions are
not an exclusive remedy, and "the buyer can invoke the restitutive measure of
recovery and obtain the total amount or value of that with which he parted,
including down payments." 124 This rule applies to either formal or substantive
violations. 125 Where the buyer attempts to recover his down payment, and the
down payment wholly or partly consists of the value of a trade-in, the extent of
his recovery is limited here to the actual retail value of the vehicle or property
traded in rather than by the value represented by the contract figure.12 6 As will
be seen later, this rule has been changed by the Rees-Levering Act.1 27
On the question of who is a proper party to the action, it should be noted
that, under the 1945 law, the buyer's right of action passes to his legal successor
in interest. 128 Under the 1961 act, however, the action is only maintainable by
the initial buyer.1 29 On the other hand, subdivision (e) of the original statute
excepted bona fide purchasers for value, but the decision in Kyle limited this
exception to cases where there was a substantive violation. Thus, the bona fide
purchaser for value of a contract offensive to the provisions of (a) or (b) could
not enforce it and would be liable on it in a buyer's action to recover for the
violation.13 0 In Lewis v. Muntz Car Co.1 3 1 the contract violated subdivision (c)
120 E.g., Williams v. Caruso Enterprises, 140 Cal.App.2d Supp. 972, 980, 295 P.2d 592, 597
(1956). Accord, General Motors Accept. Corp. v. Kyle, 54 Cal.2d 101, 111 n. 8, 351 P.2d 768,
774 n. 8, 4 Cal.Rptr. 496, 502 n. 8 (1960).
' E.g., General Motors Accept. Corp. v. Kyle, supra note 120 at 111, 351 P.2d at 774, 4
Cal.Rptr. at 502.
122 Ibid.
123 City Lincoln-Mercury Co. v. Lindsey, 52 Cal.2d 267, 276, 339 P.2d 851, 858 (1959). See
generally, Strong, The Enforceability of Illegal Contracts, 12 HASTINGs L.J. 347 (1961), discussing
the Lindsey case and the doctrine expressio unis exclusio alterius in recent California case law.
1". General Motors Accept. Corp. v. Kyle, 54 Cal.2d 101, 111 351 P.2d 768, 774, 4 Cal.Rptr.
496, 502 (1960).
125 Ibid.
126 City Lincoln-Mercury Co. v. Lindsey, 52 Cal.2d 267, 339 P.2d 851 (1959).
127 CAL. CIv. CODE § 2983.1. See text accompanying note 138 infra.
128 Stats. 1959, c. 1466, p. 3762, § 1, Bank of America v. Nielsen, 198 Cal.App.2d 131, 18
Cal.Rptr. 205 (1961).
i'-"CAL. CIV. CODE § 2981(c). See also Selected 1960-1961 California Legislation, 36 CAL.
S.B.J. 643, 688-90 (1961).
'10 General Motors Accept. Corp. v. Kyle, 54 Cal.2d 101, 351 P.2d 768, 4 Cal.Rptr. 496 (1960).
"1 50 Cal.2d 681, 328 P.2d 968 (1958).
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and the buyer's recovery was limited as against the seller's assignee to the
consideration actually paid by him to such assignee. In Kyle, however, involving
a violation of subdivision (a), the seller's assignee was liable for "that with which
the buyer parted under the illegal contract, including payments which he made
to the seller-assignor prior to the assignment."'
u 2
ACTIONS AND REMEDIES UNDER THE 1961 AcT
The above discussion represents substantially the state of the law which
was formulated prior to the passage of the Rees-Levering Act and which still
governs contracts executed before its effective date. 8  Although it has been
said that the 1961 amendments "were not intended to change the case law
insofar as it concerns what decisions have called substantive violations,"
18 4 the
Rees-Levering Act does make some very significant changes in the substantive
requisites and the effect of a violation of the provisions of the new law.
New sections 2983 and 2983.1 now cover the sanctions which are provided
for a violation of the new act and govern all actions arising under the present
statute. They replace subdivisions (e) and (f) of former section 2982, which,
however, continue to control actions on contracts executed prior to January 1,
1962.
Section 2983 provides that if the seller violates any of the provisions of
subdivision (a) or (c) of section 2982, the contract shall not be enforceable
by the seller and, if the violation is not corrected under the provisions of section
2984, the buyer may recover from the seller the "total amount paid, pursuant to
the terms of the contract, by the buyer to the seller or his assignee."
1 8 5 The
section excludes a bona fide purchaser, pledgee or assignee for value from its
provisions and does not apply to accidental or bona fide errors in computation.
It also provides that where the buyer recovers the value of his trade-in, the
amount so recoverable shall be the agreed cash value of the trade-in as it
appears on the conditional sale contract. The changes thus made by the 1961
legislature render the Lewis, Lindsey and Kyle decisions of doubtful authority
in cases involving contracts governed by the 1961 act insofar as they relate to
any of the above issues.
Section 2983.1 of the new act provides, first of all, that where the seller "or
holder" violates any of the provisions of subdivision (d), the buyer may recover
three times the amount of the finance charge paid to such person. This section
does not, however, specify the effect of a violation of subdivision (d) on the
182 General Motors Accept. Corp. v. Kyle, 54 Cal.2d 101, 114, 351 P.2d 768, 776, 4 Cal.Rptr.
496, 504 (1960).
"" E.g., Katsaros v. 0. E. Saugstad Co., 197 Cal.App.2d 745, 17 Cal.Rptr. 453 (1961).
'-" Id. at 750, 17 Cal.Rptr. at 456.
"' CAL. Civ. CODE § 2983.
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contract itself, which under the former section would be unenforceable. 36 From
the wording of the statute and the rule of construction of the Lindsey case (i.e.,
that the courts will not impose penalties other than those provided for expressly
or by necessary implication) the buyer apparently has been deprived of any
action for rescission and restitution for violation of the subdivision's require-
ments. Nevertheless the treble damage clause should provide sufficient protec-
tion in most situations.' 3 7
A second provision of section 2983.1 states that if the holder acquires the
contract without actual knowledge of the seller's violation of subdivisions (a)
or (c), the contract remains valid and enforceable by the holder except that
the buyer is excused from any obligation to pay the unpaid balance, unless the
violation is corrected according to section 2984. If, however, the holder acquires
the contract with such knowledge, and no correction is made, the contract is
not enforceable and the buyer may recover the amounts specified in section 2983.
Section 2983.1 also provides that the buyer may elect to retain the motor
vehicle and continue the contract in force, or, "with reasonable diligence," he
may rescind the contract and return the motor vehicle; provided that the contract
is unenforceable under section 2983 or other provisions of section 2983.1. Where
the buyer does elect to rescind, he shall be credited as restitution the value of
the motor vehicle, "without any decrease which results from the passage of
time," as established by the cash price figure appearing on the contract.13 8
These new provisions of sections 2983 and 2983.1 clarify some of the problems
which existed under the 1945 act. The buyer's remedy is apparently now one
and the same for either a substantive or formal violation, and the seller's right
of offset in the latter case is effectively removed. The buyer, however, is now
under a duty to provide prompt notice and an offer to return the subject vehicle.
This latter qualification was somewhat in doubt under the former law.'3 9
Section 2983.2 regulates redemption rights and requires certain notices to be
made after repossession of the motor vehicle for the buyer's default. Failure to
comply with its provisions relieve those otherwise liable on the contract from
liability for a deficiency after resale. Section 2983.5 is another "notice" require-
ment, and retains in the buyer any right of action or defense which would
otherwise be cut off by an assignment "to any third party," unless the prescribed
notices are made within certain specified periods following the assignment. 140
"I6 Stats. 1959, c. 1466, p. 3764, § 2. See Stone v. James, 142 Cal.App.2d 738, 299 P.2d 305
(1956) [decided on other grounds]. See also Selected 1960-1961 California Legislation, supra note
129, at 693-94.
"' Compare CAL. CIv. CODE § 2983.1 with Stats. 1945, a. 1030, p. 1993, § 2. The original
treble damage provision was deleted by Stats. 1949, c. 1594. See Baum v. Aleman, 139 Cal.App.2dSupp. 929, 931-32, 293 P.2d 162, 163-64 (1956).
138 CAL. CIV. CODE § 2983.1. See Selected 1960-1961 California Legislation, supra note 129,
at 694.
13I See General Motors Accept. Corp. v. Kyle, 54 Cal.2d 101, 351 P.2d 768, 4 Cal.Rptr. 496(1960); Williams v. Caruso Enterprises, 140 Cal.App.2d Supp. 973, 295 P.2d 592 (1956).
... Compare CAL. CIV. CODE § 1804.2.
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Section 2984 relieves somewhat the harshness of the effect of a violation of the
requirements of the act by providing a procedure whereby violations may be
corrected in certain situations without liability to the seller or the holder. And
section 2983.4 gives a right to recover reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing
party in any action whether instituted by or against him arising under the act.
141
TBE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
One disturbing question which remains to be answered is that concerning
the applicability of the appropriate statute of limitations. This problem has not
been resolved either by the cases under the original statute or by the 1961
revision. At the heart of the question is the critical issue of what is the exact
nature of the buyer's right of action under the statute. A cursory glance at the
cases reveals that actions have been brought under many and various titles:
action for return of money, for money had and received, for rescission and
restitution, fraud and deceit, cancellation of contract, and under common
counts. 1 42 While the action of necessity involves a written agreement, the appli-
cability of the normal four year statute of limitations 1 43 is, to this writer at least,
very doubtful. The effect of a violation on the status of the contract is another
closely related question which should have some bearing on the issue, but as
seen above, that issue itself remains to be determined.
In the City Lincoln-Mercury v. Lindsey case, the supreme court set out the
rule that courts will not impose "penalties" for noncompliance other than those
expressly provided for or arrived at by necessary implication. In the Kyle case
the court criticizes the statute for not providing a uniformly operative scheme
for "penalizing" the seller or protecting the buyer. And wherever the courts were
confronted with the issue of what sanctions to apply for a formal violation, the
guiding principle has been to decide how far the legislature desired to "penalize"
the guilty seller. 144 It is clear that the courts have left open the question of
whether a cause of action for a formal violation of the statute is or is not the
enforcement of a statutory penalty. If it is, then this writer submits that the
one-year statute of limitations for their enforcement should clearly apply, and,
consistent with the courts' labelling an offensive contract as "illegal," the cause
of action should be held to accrue upon its execution.
Stone v. James14 , is the only case in which the issue of the statute of limita-
tions is expressly raised and discussed. This lack of consideration to the problem
114 Compare CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 2982(c) and 1811.1.
41 Caveat: "But . . . a common count is no better than the company it keeps. . . . To support
such a theory [i.e., invalidity of contract for violation of the statute] plaintiff must introduce the
contract in evidence and show that it was invalid." Ruiz v. Bank of America, 135 Cal.App.2d Supp.
860, 866, 287 P.2d 409, 413 (1955). Cf. Tri-City Credit Bureau v. Brimmer, 182 Cal.App.2d 321,
6 Cal.Rptr. 107 (1960) [offset]; Driver v. Acquisto, 145 Cal.App.2d 304, 302 P.2d 387 (1956).
"' CAL. CODE CIV. PRoc. § 337. But see CAL. CODE CIV. PRoc. § 338.
'44 See, e.g., General Motors Accept. Corp. v. Kyle, 54 Cal.2d 101, 351 P.2d 768, 4 Cal.Rptr.
496 (1960).
'46 142 Cal.App.2d 738, 299 P.2d 305 (1956).
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is unusual for most of the cases involve actions filed long after the execution
of the contract and after substantial performance had been rendered. In the
Stone case the court held that subdivision (e) of the original statute was clearly
"a section enforcing a statutory penalty or forfeiture" to which the one-year
limitation of subdivision 1 of section 340 of the Code of Civil Procedure ap-
plied.146 In practically the same breath, however, the court stated that the provi-
sions of subdivisions (d) and (e) were probably severable, and that the former
granted a right to recover back finance charges-like the recovery of usurious
interest-which is in the nature of an action for money had and received and
to which, it concluded, the two-year statute of limitations applied. Since sub-
division (e) applied where the seller violates the provisions of subdivisions (c)
or (d), and under the liberal rules of pleading the buyer is probably not
required to set out with specificity which subdivisions (i.e., (d) or (e)) he is
relying upon, 147 the logic of this construction entirely escapes this writer.
In a more recent case, Gentry v. Kelley Kar Co., 1 48 the plaintiff (buyer)
alleged violations of both subdivisions (a) (formal) and (c) (substantive). The
defendant raised as a defense the one-year statute of limitations on statutory
penalties and forfeitures. The trial court found that the plaintiff's causes of
action were not barred by the statute of limitations, and its judgment was
affirmed on appeal where it was not clear whether the defense was again
urged. Apart from its bare affirmation of the trial court, the opinion sheds no
light on the issue.
Under the 1961 statute, section 2983 combines the formal and substantive
violations and provides, where the seller is concerned at least, one remedy for
both. Inasmuch as section 2983.1 now precludes the seller from asserting an
offset, the effect of a formal violation is now the same as a substantive violation.
Since the nucleus of these new provisions can be found in subdivision (e) of
the repealed section 2982, the conclusion follows that sections 2983 and 2983.1,
whether construed together or apart, are in the form of a statutory penalty. In
such a case, then, following the rule of Stone v. James, the one-year limitation of
the Code of Civil Procedure should apply to actions arising under the 1961 act.
CONCLUSION
The effect of the 1961 "reformulation" of the Automobile Finance Law will
have a twofold effect on subsequent cases and litigation. On the one hand, it
has clarified some problems which existed under the original statute. It should
140 Id. at 741, 299 P.2d 307. Cf. Lewis v. Muntz Car Co., 50 Cal.2d 681, 328 P.2d 968
(1958): "It is concluded that section 2982, subdivision (e), imposes a penalty .. " Id. at 687,
328 P.2d at 972 (emphasis supplied). If the Stone v. James decision is right here, as this writer
submits, then venue may be another procedural problem presenting interesting possibilities; see
CAL. CODE CIV. Pnoc. § 393() (a).
"4 See CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. §§ 452, 469, 475.
a, 193 Cal.App.2d 324, 14 Cal.Rptr. 121 (1961).
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be noted, however, that in many of the cases the same issues had been satis-
factorily worked out in the courts. 149 On the other hand, the Rees-Levering Act
adds to the law many new requirements and procedures which must now be
adhered to by dealers in the new and used car business. The act also leaves
unsolved some questions which have always been and continue to be of para-
mount importance, at least theoretically. The added provisions of the act,
furthermore, do not follow a uniform pattern, for while one provision strengthens
the protection of the buyer, another lessens the burden on the seller. Which class
the legislature intended to benefit most by the revision is impossible to deter-
mine. It can be argued that many of the new requirements add nothing sub-
stantial to the buyer's protection under the repealed act and are an unnecessary
endeavor to make the present statute conform more closely to the Unruh legis-
lation of 1959. Moreover, some of the act's new exclusions and limitations on
the buyer's recovery, may well lead to abuses and unfair practices and deprive
the car-buying public of material benefits which it formerly enjoyed. A pre-
ferred solution, it is submitted, would have been merely to clarify the existing
legislative policies under the statute, grant more discretion to the trial judge,
and leave procedural problems to the appellate courts.
Richard J. Kohlman*
* Third year student, University of Santa Clara School of Law. Editor-in-Chief, The Santa
Clara Lawyer.
149 For a bit of irony, however, see General Motors Accept. Corp. v. Kyle, 54 Cal.2d 101, 351
P.2d 768, 4 Cal.Rptr. 496 (1960) where the following statement appears: "The Legislature has
since repeatedly amended section 2982, and the courts have since frequently passed upon the effect
of violations, but, except for implied recognition in 1951 of the rule of unenforceability announced
in the Carter case, none of the amendments state the effect of formal violations or clarify the effect
of substantive violations. Therefore, we take it, the Legislature has been satisfied with the efforts of
the courts to work out these problems as to which it has chosen to remain silent." Id. at 110, 351
P.2d at 773, 4 Cal.Rptr. at 501.
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